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Preface
This is one of three reports on the relationship between gender equity, family
structure and dynamics, and the achievement of reproductive choice prepared by the
Population Council for the 1994 International Year of the Family and the 1994
International Conference on Population and Development. These reports provide
critical reviews of the relationship between gender inequality and demographic
behavior in three demographically significant, culturally distinct parts of the
developing world: (1) Egypt, (2) India, and (3) Ghana and Kenya. Their purpose
is to help governments and international agencies design and implement policies that
are affirmative of women, sensitive to the family's central role in resource
allocation and distribution, and effective in achieving broad-based population and
development goals.
As a companion to these reports, the Population Council will issue a pamphlet in
its series of Issues Papers on gender inequality and demographic change. This will
provide a population policy agenda focusing on policies that support women's status
and access to resources and that are likely to have desirable demographic impacts.
This series of reports has been made possible through the generous support of the
United Nations Population Fund under Project INT/92/P57—The Family and
Population Policy: Towards the Realization of Full Reproductive Choice.

IV

Egypt is currently undergoing very rapid demographic changes. Earlier mortality
declines are now being matched by dramatic fertility shifts.

The proportion of

couples practicing contraception is nearing 50 percent, having doubled in the 1980s
(El-Zanaty et al., 1993).

This trend reflects a very profound change in the

preferences and aspirations of Egyptians for themselves and for their children. This
has occurred during a period of public debate about the place of Islamic law in civil
society, with particular implications for the appropriate roles of men and women in
public and private life. Despite a recent trend toward women's greater participation
in the public arena through their growing access to education, employment, and
political participation, women remain largely responsible for the care of the family
and the home.

Gender relations within the family have been characterized by

mutual responsibilities and complementary activities, with men and women seen as
having very different but equally valued roles. Most Egyptians continue to view a
strong cohesive family, based upon the interdependence of husbands and wives, as
the central source of their status and happiness.

However, the recent rise in

contraceptive practice among reproductive-aged women, which emerges from the
intimate reproductive decisions of a growing number of Egyptian couples, reflects
the changing roles and aspirations of men and women, and may be a precursor to
further changes in gender relations.
Currently in Egypt, a fundamental tension exists between women's civil and
political rights as expressed in the Egyptian constitution (and various United Nations
conventions ratified by the Egyptian government) and women's rights within the
family as defined by Islamic Personal Status Law (Badran, 1991). Men and women
have a right to legal equality in matters outside the home, but are subject to legal
inequality inside the home (Abdel Kader, 1990). Four areas of the current Personal
Status Law have been particularly problematic for Egyptian women:

(1) the

arbitrary and unilateral rights of the husband to divorce, (2) the absolute and
unquestioned right of the husband to marry up to four wives, (3) mothers' and

fathers' rights and obligations relating to the financial support, custody, and
guardianship of children in cases of divorce or the death of a spouse (Hussein,
1985), and (4) inequitable inheritance provisions. Reforms to the Personal Status
Law enacted in 1985—following a more liberal attempt at reform in 1979, which
was unsuccessful for procedural reasons—left men's right to polygyny intact so as
not to offend Islamic fundamentalist feeling (Zulficar, 1993c). In an international
forum discussing Egypt's reservation about Article 16 of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, which requires the
equality of men and women in all matters relating to marriage and family life,
Egypt stated that the provisions of Islamic law must prevail in family matters and
that Islamic law governing marital relations may not be called into question
(Sullivan, 1992).'

1 Egypt's argument is an example of the conflict between competing human rights
values—in this case, between gender equality and religious freedom. The principle of gender
equality is grounded in the UN Charter. The prohibition against gender discrimination is
reiterated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on
Human Rights, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (Sullivan, 1992).
Sullivan asserts that "international law... permits states to implement religious law in
national law and guarantees individuals and communities the right to observe religious law.
The freedom of religion or belief may not be asserted, however, to shield religious law
affecting women's status from international scrutiny. Moreover, restrictions may be imposed
on religious law and practice if they are necessary to protect women's human rights and
fundamental freedoms and are prescribed by law" (Sullivan, 1992: 810).
Sullivan provides a framework based upon international human rights norms that can
be used to resolve conflicts between religious freedom and gender equality. Sullivan argues
that these norms (which at present do not include the prohibition of systematic gender
discrimination as one of the norms of customary international law with peremptory status,
although it is a strong candidate for inclusion) permit limitations on the freedom of religion
or belief that are necessary to ensure that gender inequalities do not impair women's de jure
and de facto rights. Whether or not such limitations are needed can be determined from a set
of factors (see Sullivan, 1992: 855) as well as a consideration of the role that class, race,
ethnicity, region, national identity, and the structure of state power play in shaping women's
de facto rights.

The objectives of this report are to examine the legal, social, and policy
context in which gender relations operate in Egypt and to better understand the links
between gender dynamics and reproductive behavior. In any society, disparities
between the rights and responsibilities of men and women create conditions of
inequality. In Egypt, for example, one disparity is unequal access to divorce. We
use the term "inequality" in the objective, factual sense—noting, however, some of
the positive and negative consequences of inequality as they are expressed by
Egyptian writers and researchers.
Implicit in government population policies—which, in the case of Egypt,
include not only family planning service provision but also legal and economic
measures— "are certain assumptions about the family and the role men and women
play within it" (Lloyd, 1993). Disparities between these assumptions about gender
roles and contemporary realities, therefore, become an important part of the story.
Since the 1960s, the Egyptian government has had a stated policy commitment to
lower rates of population growth, but until recently efforts had appeared to be
relatively unsuccessful. To what extent is recent success due to more realistic
policies as well as to more fundamental changes in economic and family life? Within
the Egyptian context, is greater gender equity a necessary prerequisite to demo
graphic change or a necessary outgrowth of it?
In addressing these questions, the report explores gender inequalities within
the family, in the more public life of education and work, and within the reproduc
tive health service delivery system. To provide a context for this discussion, the
report begins with a brief review of demographic trends and population policies in
the last three decades.

This review is followed by a discussion of gender

inequalities within the family as they are reflected in patterns of marriage and
divorce, the division of resources and responsibilities, and power in intimate
relationships. The third section explores gender inequalities in public life as they

relate to education, employment, and access to property. The final section looks
at reproductive health services, including abortion services, and the extent to which
they are responding to the needs of women and men. The conclusion identifies
policy priorities that address simultaneously issues of gender equity and of
reproductive health and choice.
The Population Problem and the Government's Response
Rapid population growth is viewed by the Egyptian government as being the main
deterrent to socioeconomic development (United Nations, 1987). The population
growth rate, which was estimated to have peaked in the rnid 1980s at 2.6 percent,
is beginning to fall slightly (United Nations, 1993). Deaths to children under the
age of five have fallen from 300 to 94 per 1,000 live births in the last 30 years
(Ross et al., 1992) and the total fertility rate (TFR), estimated to be around 7 births
per woman in the early 1960s, had fallen to about 4 children per woman by the
early 1990s (see Table 1).

While fertility rates have fallen throughout Egypt,

declines have been particularly steep in urban lower Egypt, where the TFR is now
slightly below 3. As a result, there are growing regional disparities in fertility, with
a fertility differential of 3 births between urban lower Egypt and rural upper Egypt.
The decline in fertility has been accompanied by a rise in the age at first
marriage and dramatic increases in contraceptive use (see Table 2). Underlying this
increased contraceptive use is widespread knowledge and approval of family
planning.

However, recent increases in contraceptive prevalence could have led

to even lower fertility if it were not for unusually high rates of contraceptive
discontinuation and failure, primarily due to side effects and the incorrect use of the
pill (Egypt National Population Council, 1991; Sayed et al., 1989).
The childbearing preferences of Egyptian women, if implemented, suggest
that further fertility declines are likely.

The average ideal family size of ever-

Table 1
Trends in Total Fertility Rates By Region:
Selected Periods 1960-1992
Total Fertility Rate
Egypt
Period

Lower Egypt

Upper Egypt

Urban

Rural

Urban

Rural

1960-1965

7.09

7.04

7.51

7.43

7.82

1965-1970

6.53

5.47

7.40

6.49

7.65

1970-1975

5.53

4.46

6.52

5.68

6.61

1975-1980

5.27

4.29

6.00

5.87

6.32

1984-1988"

4.66

3.95

5.22

4.35

6.38

1986-1991

4.55

3.46

4.89

3.86

6.71

1990-1992

3.93

2.80

4.10

3.58

5.97

a!984-88 TFRs based on women aged 15-44.
Sources: 1960-80 data from Hallouda et al. (1983), Vol. 2, Table 4.19;
1984-88 data from Sayed et al. (1989), Table 3.1; 1986-91 data from Osheba
and Ahmed (1992), Table 13.12; 1990-92 data from Egypt NPC 1993, Tables
4 and 5.
married women, as reported in the 1992 Egyptian Demographic and Health Survey
(EDHS), was 2.9 children. However, 20 percent of currently married women who
indicate a desire to space births or limit childbearing are not currently practicing
family planning (El-Zanaty et al., 1993).
Egypt was the first Arab country to address population issues at the level of
national policy (United Nations, 1987). That involvement began in the early 1950s.
Early on, the focus of population policy was on the provision of family planning

Table 2
Trends in Current Contraceptive Use
1980-1992
Percent of Couples Using
Survey Year

_____Any Method

Any Modern Method"

1980
1984

24.2
30.3

22.8
28.7

1988
1991

37.8
47.6

35.4
44.3

1992___________________47.1____________44.8______
"Modern methods include oral contraception, IUD, condom, sterilization,
injectables, and diaphragm/foam/jelly (or vaginal methods).
Source: El-Zanaty et al., 1993.
services, first through the private sector and later through the public sector. In the
1970s, the scope of population policy expanded. It was recognized that population
growth was affected by socioeconomic development; hence, the manipulation of
socioeconomic characteristics was included as part of the comprehensive population
policy (Sayed, 1989). The current scope of population policy includes (1) family
planning, (2) maternal and child welfare, (3) women and development, (4)
population information, education, and communication (IEC), (5) labor and
employment, (6) youth, (7) environment, (8) education, and (9) land use (Egypt
National Population Council, 1991).
This expanded scope reflects a redefinition of Egypt's population problem.
Rapid population growth dominated early discussions of the situation. Later, in the

early 1970s, population quality and spatial distribution became part of Egypt's
population problems. Hence, population policies stressed the importance, not only
of supplying family planning services, but also of promoting socioeconomic change
that would alter the demand for family planning services (Sayed, 1989).

(See

Sayed, 1989 and Ibrahim, S., 1994 for a more detailed description of the evolution
of population policy.)
In reproductive matters, Egyptian population policy explicitly favors couple
or family rights over individual rights. For example, one of the guiding principles
of the 1986 National Population Policy is the "recognition of the right of each
family [emphasis added] to decide on the appropriate number of children to have
and their right to obtain information and means to enable them to achieve their
decision within the framework of religion, Egypt's civilization, and the values of
its society" (Sayed, 1989: 13). This preference for couple rights is clearly stated
and is underlined by the reference to religious and societal values. The preferred
Islamic position on family planning decisionmaking is that it involves the mutual
agreement of spouses (Omran, 1992). The policy emphasis on family or couple
rights as opposed to individual rights introduces the possibility of gender inequalities
in reproductive matters that are explicitly prohibited by international conventions to
which Egypt is a signator (such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women). However, this policy is not implemented at the
program level, where services are primarily provided to women. Spousal consent
is not required for the use of family planning methods. (One possible exception is
female sterilization, which is discussed later in this report; see Fathalla, 1993.)
The effectiveness of Egypt's population policy in meeting its objectives has
been mixed. The most obvious sign of recent success is the large increase in
contraceptive prevalence. One factor that has contributed to the increase in
contraceptive use is the increased availability of family planning services in Egypt.

Most women (96 percent) and men (93 percent) know where they can obtain family
planning services (Sayed et al., 1989; Sayed et ah, 1992). Moreover, two of three
married rural women have a source of family planning in the village in which they
live, and 96 percent live within 5 kilometers of a source (Sayed, 1991). This
indicator of success is, however, tempered by data documenting (1) less dramatic
recent declines in fertility, (2) gaps in women's knowledge about the ovulatory cycle
and the correct use of family planning methods, (3) the concern about side effects,
(4) the extent of unplanned and unwanted births, (5) the extent of high-risk
pregnancies, and (6) the large regional differentials in reproductive behavior
(particularly in rural Upper Egypt).
Another sign of success of Egypt's population policy lies in the improvement
in child health.

Infant and child mortality have declined substantially since the

1970s (Osheba, 1992).

Despite the overall improvements in child health, some

areas lag behind—for example, low-income areas in urban centers (Shorter, 1989),
and rural Upper Egypt. Moreover, although declines in infant and child mortality
were greater among female children (Osheba, 1992), a gender gap still exists in
child mortality and possibly, infant mortality.

In addition, boys tend to receive

higher-quality health care in the form of private providers versus public providers
than do girls (El-Zanaty et ah, 1993).
Maternal health has only recently become an active focus of population
policy. Egypt established the National Council for Childhood and Motherhood in
order to provide the proper economic, social, and health conditions for safe
motherhood (Mubarak, 1989). Thus far, the primary emphasis of this initiative has
been on child welfare and reducing maternal mortality. Little or no attention has
been paid to reproductive morbidity, both gynecological and obstetric, or other
aspects of women's health, such as the practice of female circumcision, which
remains widespread and approved (see Lane, 1992; Esmael, 1992).
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Although the

least severe form of female circumcision is performed in Egypt, day as. traditional
birth attendants, perform this procedure on girls between the ages of 6 and 10 years
without anesthesia and with little concern for hygiene and possible complications
(Abdel Kader, 1991).
Egypt has also used law as an instrument of population policy. One example
is the legislation setting 16 as a minimum age of marriage for women and 18 for
men. 2 Other examples include tax and labor laws, which provide tax exemptions
for up to three children but no more and maternity benefits for up to three
pregnancies (Azer, 1979). 3 Furthermore, imported family planning methods are
not taxed and family planning advertisements are exempted from regulations and
license fees (Azer, 1979).
Other laws, which grant women equal rights to education and employment,
if applied, also may indirectly influence fertility; however, the primary motivation
for these laws was not their fertility implications. One area in which Egypt has
made limited use of legal reform as an instrument of population policy is in the area
of family law. At the moment, a fairly vocal minority, using religion and gender
issues as a platform for winning political power, has succeeded in preventing reforms.4

2 The minimum age restrictions on age at marriage derive from secular law, not Islam.
In Islam, there is no fixed age for marriage (Omran, 1992).
3 The implicit promotion of a three-child family expressed in secular law is also apparent
in a 1988 fatwa (formal religious opinion) on family planning issued by Sheikh Tantawi, the
current Mufti of Egypt. In addition to approving of family planning for economic, cultural,
or health reasons, the Mufti approved of family planning for a rich couple with three children
because they live in a country that needs to restrict the size of its population (Omran 1992:
229).
4 Although Shari'a (Islamic law) is usually presented as the sole legitimate and eternal
formulation of Islamic law, in fact it is a historically conditioned understanding of Islam by
early Muslim jurists (Toubia and An-Na'im, n.d.). As such, Shari'a can be reconstructed by
modern Muslim jurists within the framework of Islam through the reinterpretation of the
Our'an and Sunna.

Gender Inequalities Within the Family
The family is the central and most valued social institution in Egypt (Rugh, 1984;
Loza, 1988).

Egyptians see their happiness as residing in marriage, in having

children, in experiencing a satisfying family life, and in exerting efforts to
strengthen and coalesce family ties. Because of the centrality of family, Egyptian
society values family roles over public roles (Rugh, 1984). Through marriage,
women are able to achieve status and respect in their roles as wives and mothers.

In anticipation of the changing interest and needs of the Muslim community over time
and place, an order of flexibility and adaptability (of Islamic law) was allowed (Omran, 1992).
Some elements of Shari'a. such as the fundamental Islamic tenets on creed, ritual (ibadat). and
ethic derived from the Our 'an and the Sunna. cannot be changed (Al-Nowaihi, 1979). For
example, the established commandments and prohibitions (murder, alcohol, pork, fornication,
stealing, cheating, false witness, and so on) must be respected (Omran, 1992). Flexibility and
adaptability is permitted in other areas, such as social, business, personal, and communal life
(mu'amalat) (Omran, 1992: 81). In fact, according to the classical Science of Principles of
Jurisprudence, these provisions must be changed, if circumstances change, in order to achieve
the public good of the Muslim nation (Al-Nowaihi, 1979: 102).
Two issues motivate reform efforts to improve the status and rights of women within
Islamic law. The first is the recognition that "Islamic law" with respect to the rights and status
of women takes a variety of forms in Muslim countries (Shaheed, 1993). The second is the
recognition that the important Islamic principle of equality of all believers before God contrasts
with the principle of complementarity that governs gender relations (Badran, 1991 ; Obermeyer,
1992; Ahmed, L., 1992). According to Islamic law, men are heads of the family with
responsibility for financial maintenance of the family. The wife owes obedience to the
husband as head. In return for that obedience she can claim financial support regardless of
her resources. The wife is also responsible for care of the children, home, and husband. So,
men and women have different, but complementary roles in the family. However, in practice
women do not have all the same rights as men. Men can take up to 4 wives, and also have
easier access to divorce.
Reform can occur in several ways. Reform can be achieved within the parameters of
historical formulations of Islamic law by "patching" (talfiq) together parts of doctrine from
different schools of Islamic law (An'-Na'im, 1990), since no school has a monopoly on the
truth and Muslims are not obligated to follow any particular school (Omran, 1992). In fact,
Omran argues that Muslims are encouraged to consider various opinions rather than restricting
themselves to one school at all times (Omran, 1992: 152). Reform can be achieved by
reinterpreting the sources of Islamic law, the Our'an and the Sunna (Shaheed, forthcoming;
Toubia and An-Na'im, n.d.; Al-Nowaihi, 1979).
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Most Egyptian women, regardless of social class, view success in terms of a
husband and a happy family life (Mohsen, 1985). Likewise, through marriage, men
achieve status and respect as good providers and as protectors of the family (Rugh,
1984; Loza, 1988). (Further research is needed to explore the sources of status and
respect among Egyptian men.)
Despite the strength of the family and the high social value placed on
mutuality within marriage in Egypt, economic changes accompanied by rising
material aspirations are leading to increased risks and responsibilities for women not
only within marriage but also outside of it. The complementarity of roles that has
traditionally been a source of strength in marriage (reflecting its standing as an
institution of mutual support) can become a source of weakness within marriage
when the growing economic contribution of women to family finances results in no
measurable improvement in their other domestic responsibilities or rights.
Furthermore, the interdependence between husbands and wives can leave women
particularly vulnerable outside marriage if they have to fend for themselves.
In this section, we explore the rights and responsibilities of men and women
within traditional Egyptian marriage, pointing out its sources of strength and
potential vulnerabilities. We then look at what this implies for women's autonomy
and reproductive decisionmaking, particularly in the context of any changes in
marriage patterns and family living arrangements.
Legal and Customary Aspects of Marriage
Marriage and divorce for the Muslim majority are governed by Personal Status Law
No. 100 of 1985. 5 Islamic law, in most cases derived from the Hanafi school,

5 See Rugh (1984) for a discussion of Christian marriage and divorce practices in Egypt.
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informs the content of this law (Azer, 1979). The manner in which Islamic law is
implemented, however, is determined by the State.
Muslim marriages are contracted upon the agreement of the two parties in the
presence of two witnesses. According to Islam, a woman cannot be forced into
marriage by her family or guardian (Omran, 1992). Obtaining a woman's consent
is important, given the high percentage of women whose husbands are selected by
someone other than themselves (Nawar et al., 1994). The marriage contract can
include a variety of conditions, as long as they are compatible with the general
principles of Islamic law (The Communication Group, 1992). An essential clause
in the marriage contract, which is widely included in Egyptian marriage contracts,
is the mahr. a payment by the groom to the bride (Early, 1985). The mahr can be
paid as a lump sum at the time of marriage or it can be paid in two install
ments—the first at marriage, and the second upon divorce or the husband's death
(Rugh, 1984). 6

Other assets that are exchanged include, for example, the

engagement present (al-shabka). preferably gold jewelry, that the groom gives to the
bride. He is also responsible for preparing a home.
The financial responsibility of the bride and her family is more limited. They
are usually required to provide furniture and household items. One common use of
the mahr is to defray the expenses for these items. Rugh (1984) notes that some
parents in the lower classes prefer that all of the mahr be paid before marriage in
order to help in the purchase of the bride's furnishings, which remain her property
whether her husband dies or divorces her.

6 The installment method can create an economic deterrent to divorce (Bowen, 1992).
However, including the divorce installment of the mahr in the marriage contract can be a
sensitive subject at the time of marriage negotiations. Although the bride's family may want
to include such provisions to enhance her economic and marital security, they may refrain
from taking such precautions for fear of creating bad feelings (Rugh, 1984).
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The assets that each partner brings to the marriage are often legally
documented so as to avoid any uncertainties in the event of divorce (Abaza, 1987).
In Muslim households, the property of each spouse is carefully distinguished (Rugh,
1984). Assets acquired within marriage (for example, land, household durables,
and so forth) legally become the property of one or the other spouse by putting that
spouse's name on the deed or receipt (Hoodfar, 1988). One method that women
employ to obtain assets from their husbands during marriage is to amass gifts from
them, usually in the form of gold jewelry. This practice of a clear division of assets
(as opposed to having common property) stems, in part, from the tradition of
financial independence granted to women by Islamic law as well as from the
contractual nature of marriage under Islam in general (Rugh, 1984; Bowen, 1992).
Other conditions can be included in the marriage contract. For example, the
right to divorce without court intervention (talaq) can be granted to the wife by the
husband in the marriage contract (Rugh, 1984). The inclusion of this provision
does not deprive the husband of the unilateral right to divorce, a widely held, but
erroneous belief in Egypt. The wife may also stipulate that the husband may not
take an additional wife or that she has the right to work outside the home. Due to
social custom and lack of awareness, however, women exercise these options
infrequently; only 20 percent of Egyptian women in a recent study had any idea
about women's rights (CAPMAS, 1993). One survey found that, while 50 percent
of women knew that they were entitled to include conditions in the marriage
contract, they reported that social customs prevented them from insisting on this
right (A Group of Interested Ladies, 1988). When asked what conditions should be
included in a marriage contract, 86 percent stated "good treatment by the husband."
The specification of the ways and means of ending marital bonds does not appear
to be common in Egyptian marriage contracts, although it is common in other
Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia (The Communication Group, 1992).
13

It is widely believed that the occasion of marriage should not be marred by
a discussion of potential problems and conditions.

One solution that has been

proposed is for the government to issue a new standard marriage contract with many
of the basic conditions included. This would eliminate the awkwardness involved
in safeguarding women's rights at the time of drawing up a marriage contract (The
Communication Group, 1992).
Egyptian marriages are more likely to be dissolved by death (71 percent of
first marriage dissolutions) than by divorce or separation (29 percent) (CAPMAS,
1993). Under Islamic and Egyptian law, a widow is entitled to a portion of her
husband's estate. However, a husband inherits twice the share of his wife's estate
as compared with a wife when her husband dies. 7 The existence of inequality in
the inheritance laws has been explained by differences in responsibilities—that is,
larger shares are needed by men so that they may discharge their financial
responsibilities (Omran, 1992). The power of this argument is reduced when women
assume greater responsibility for the financial well-being of the family.
In general, a widow receives one-fourth of the estate if there are no children;
if there are children she receives one-eighth (Rugh, 1984). The husband inherits
one-half of the wife's estate if there are no children; he inherits one-fourth if there
are children (Bowen, 1992). In addition to their share of the estate, widows with

7 Egyptian inheritance law contravenes the UN Charter-based principle of gender equality
and a 1962 resolution calling for gender equality (that is, men and women in the same degree
of relationship to the deceased) in inheritance and succession. The principle that males are
entitled to twice the share of females is found in many parts of inheritance law. In theory,
Egypt is required to reform discriminatory inheritance laws and customary practices under
articles 2, 5, and 15 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women and article 6(a) of the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women (Sullivan 1992: 842). In practice, such reform would be difficult to
undertake largely because the inheritance provisions are taken directly from the Our'an. For
example, even Tunisia, while able to reform other areas of Personal Status Law, was not able
to tackle inheritance law (Sullivan, 1992).
14

young children usually have effective access to their children's shares. The wife's
share can be increased if the husband makes use of Article 37 of the Law of
Testamentary Dispositions of 1946, which permits an individual to bequeath onethird of his estate to another who was already an heir to his property (Rugh, 1984).
The extent to which women actually receive their rightful share in inheritance
is not known. A certain amount of abuse appears to exist. Egyptian women are
legally entitled to inherit and own land, but often do not exercise their rights. For
example, in some rural areas, women are often forced to give their share of the
landed inheritance to their brothers (Adams, 1986). Whether or not they receive
other forms of compensation for their land share is not known.
A widow is also entitled to her husband's pension. According to the Social
Insurance Law of 1975, a woman whose husband or father dies has certain rights
of access to the man's pension.

These rights extend to wives, daughters, and

sisters. 8 Sons and brothers are not eligible for these rights.
Guardianship of children is another issue that faces widows. According to
the law, a male relative should become the legal guardian of the surviving children;
however, Egyptian judges have been known to award guardianship to widows
(Zulficar, 1993b), presumably a recognition of their financial self-sufficiency.
According to Islam, divorce is allowed, but strongly discouraged unless there
is no alternative (Omran, 1992). In Egypt, divorce can occur in several ways, with
more options available to men than to women.

The husband can dissolve the

marriage contract without the intervention of the court simply by repudiating his
wife three times (talaq) (Rugh, 1984). As noted above, the wife may also obtain

8 The wife has the right to her dead husband's pension, regardless of her own pension or
marital status. Daughters and sisters, who were dependent upon the deceased father or
brother, are entitled to the pension as long as they are not married. If they get married and
subsequently become divorced or widowed, they become entitled to the pension again
(Madkour, 1990).
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divorce in this way if it was stipulated in the marriage contract.

Although the

husband can divorce his wife without recourse to the courts, he is legally required
to register the divorce and inform his wife (Hussein, 1985). 9

Prior to this

requirement, men divorced their wives secretly as a way to avoid the mandatory
one-year alimony (Al-Nowaihi, 1979). Failure to register the divorce and inform
the wife results in a penalty (Hussein, 1985).
As for women, a wife must seek a divorce through the courts. Although
husbands are not limited by conditions when they divorce, wives can only petition
for divorce on specific grounds (Rugh, 1984). I0 According to Egyptian Law No.
25/1929, a wife may seek a divorce on the grounds of (1) nonsupport, (2) husband's
incurable sickness or defect, and (3) harm (through deeds or words, through absence
or imprisonment). Because proving harm or damage in court can be very difficult,
it is important that women include conditions in the marriage contract that exempt
them from having to prove harm in order to obtain a divorce. One such condition
is the wife's unconditional right to divorce. Another condition is the "no second
wife" provision. Inclusion of this provision exempts the wife from having to prove
to a judge that she has suffered damage (a requirement of Personal Status Law
100/1985) in order to obtain a divorce when her husband married another woman
(The Communication Group, 1992).
There are two additional ways in which divorce can be obtained. The first
is by mutual consent, where a woman pays the husband a certain amount to
compensate him for his expenses. However, the wife who obtains a divorce by

9 According to Personal Status Law 100/1985, the husband is required to notarize the
divorce with the ma'zoun (a government official who performs marriages), within 30 days.
The notary public delivers a copy of the divorce paper to the divorced wife (The Communica
tion Group, 1992).
10 Unlike most of Personal Status Law in Egypt, which is derived from the Hanafi school,
the grounds for a wife to seek divorce are derived from the Maliki school (Azer, 1979).
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mutual consent forfeits her financial rights either totally or in part. The second is
annulment of a marriage that has been contracted in violation of prohibitions (Rugh,
1984).
Because of the different means by which men and women obtain divorces in
Egypt, there can be a large difference in the amount of time and resources that men
and women expend on obtaining a divorce (CAPMAS and UNICEF, 1992).
Women can spend many years in court trying to obtain a divorce, whereas men can
obtain a divorce immediately whenever they like (Zulficar, 1993a).
The legal rights of the divorced wife include (1) custody of children until
certain ages, after which the husband assumes custody; (2) full child support; 11 (3)
one year of alimony; 12

(4) the deferred mahr payment (mu'akher el-sadaq)

11 According to Personal Status Law 100/1985, the father should pay child support if
children have no money of their own. In this case, fathers have full responsibility for the
financial support of their sons until the age of 15 years and this support can be discontinued
only when the son is capable of working. Schooling, mental and physical disability, and
unavailability of work are considered when determining the son's "capability." Fathers must
support daughters as long as they remain unmarried, are widowed, or divorced (unless they
earn a living) (Rugh, 1984; Koura and Hamed, 1989). The size of the child-support payment
is determined by a judge according to the father's wealth, the cost of living, and the standard
of living (Koura and Hamed, 1989).
Nonpayment of child support legally requires imprisonment. The maximum sentence
for the first offense is 30 days, regardless of the size of the debt. According to Article 293
of the Penal Code, subsequent offenses require a one-year prison term and a fine not exceeding
100 LE—approximately 30 U.S. dollars. Law 62 of 1976, which applies to all Egyptians,
regardless of religion, gives priority to alimony as a debt over all other debts (Koura and
Hamed, 1989; The Communication Group, 1992).
The legal responsibility of fathers (or male next of kin—father's father or brother) to
maintain children (nafaqa) does not depend on the marital status of the parents or the custody
arrangements of the children. The other legal responsibility of fathers is guardianship
(wilaya). Mothers are responsible for care (hid ana) (Rugh, 1984).
12 A divorced wife is entitled to one year's maintenance plus compensation equal to two
years' maintenance. The court can increase the latter amount in the event of extra damage or
according to marital duration. The first installments should be paid to the Nasser Bank, which
is empowered to collect them (Hussein, 1985).
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stipulated in the marriage contract; (5) breastfeeding compensation; 13 and (6)
adequate housing during the period of child custody 14 (Rugh, 1984; Sullivan et al.,
1990). Mothers have custody of boys until the age of 10 and of girls until 12 years.
The court can extend maternal custody to 15 years for boys and until marriage for
girls.

The mother's right to custody remains in effect as long as she does not

remarry (The Communication Group, 1992).
Do divorced women obtain these rights in practice?

Although it is not

possible to make generalizations, it appears that at least some women do not. For
example, Rugh (1984) reports that few divorced women in lower-income areas of
Cairo receive either alimony or child-support payments from their husbands except
sporadically or through coercion from the courts. Also, few fathers in these areas
implement their legitimate claims to child custody, either because they are unable
to care for the children or their new wives do not welcome children from a previous

The one-year maintenance covers the idda period, in which a divorced woman is
forbidden to remarry. The purpose of this period is to determine whether the wife is pregnant
by her former husband. During the idda period, the woman is entitled to other rights of a
legal wife, such as inheritance (Rugh, 1984).
The size of the alimony payment is determined according to the husband's ability to
pay, but cannot be less than what a women must have for necessities (Rugh, 1984).
In order to safeguard the wife's right to alimony in the case of divorce, it is important
that women include a "right to work" condition in the marriage contract. Although this right
is guaranteed by the Egyptian Constitution and law and is not contingent upon the husband's
approval, in practice some husbands have claimed that they were opposed to their wife's
working and, therefore, should not have to pay alimony (The Communication Group, 1992).
13 A husband should pay his former wife an amount that compensates her for the period
she nurses her children (Rugh, 1984). Whether a divorced wife receives this compensation
depends upon the status of the marriage contract (i.e., official or unofficial) and alimony
payments. In general, a divorced wife is not entitled to both alimony and breastfeeding
compensation. For example, a wife with an unofficial marriage contract (orfy) may not
request alimony according to Article 99 of the Bill for the Regulation of Shari'a Courts.
Hence, she is entitled to the breastfeeding compensation (Koura and Hamed, 1989).
14 Both Muslim and Christian women have this right (The Communication Group, 1992).
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marriage (Rugh, 1984; Hoodfar, 1990). A recent study found that 74 percent of
divorced and separated women report that they do not receive financial support from
their ex-husbands (CAPMAS, 1993). Collecting child support has become more
difficult with the increased geographical mobility of men. Many women find court
battles over child support too costly or too humiliating and the returns too meager
to justify the process (Mohsen, 1985).
In addition to the gender inequalities in divorce law, de facto inequalities
limit women's rights. Traditional attitudes toward divorced women have tended to
discourage women from seeking divorce. A social stigma is attached to divorce for
a woman, even when she lives with her children.

Moreover, economic barri

ers—insufficient resources to maintain a household, difficulty in collecting child
support, and limited assistance from the family—make it difficult to divorce
(Mohsen, 1985; Hoodfar, 1990).
Marriage Patterns and Family Living Arrangements
Marriage remains nearly universal in Egypt. By the age of 45-49 only 1 percent
of men and women have never married (Ahmed, F., 1992).

Eighty percent of

women report that their marriages have been arranged (CAPMAS, 1993), with
roughly 40 percent of marriages being contracted between relatives (El-Zanaty et
al., 1993).

Although sexually integrated educational and work settings have

increased the role that individuals play in finding marital partners, families continue
to play an important role in finding appropriate candidates, in marriage negotiations,
and in contributing to the very expensive costs of marriage (Rugh, 1984;
Singerman, 1986; Ahmed, L., 1992). Among currently married women over the age
of 50, 90 percent reported that their marriages had been arranged by others; that
proportion declined to 68 percent for currently married women under 30 (Nawar et
al., 1994).
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The median age at first marriage has increased from 18.3 years among evermarried women aged 45-49 to 19.9 years among 25-29-year-olds. The decline in
the percent of women marrying in their teens has been particularly sharp, with the
percentage who had married by their eighteenth birthday having fallen from 47
percent among women 45-49 to 27 percent among women 20-24.

There are

substantial regional disparities with the median age at marriage three years higher
in urban than in rural areas (El-Zanaty et al., 1993).
Over 70 percent of women's reproductive years are spent currently married
in Egypt. Among ever-married women, 77 percent (up from 73 percent in 1980) are
still with their first husband at the end of their reproductive years. There is no
evidence that the incidence of divorce is increasing (United Nations, 1987; Lloyd,
1993).
By the age of 60-64, only 57 percent of women are currently married,
whereas at the same age, 96 percent of men are married (see Table 3). Nonethe
less, these data represent a significant improvement over the last decade. In 1980,
only 38 percent of women were married at this age, compared with 94 percent of
men.

In this same age group, 3 percent of men and 42 percent of women are

widowed, with negligible proportions in the single and divorced categories. Older
men rarely find themselves having to manage without a spouse because they tend
to marry younger women and they are more likely to remarry (PAPCHILD,
1993). 15 The higher proportion of older women married in the most recent period
is likely to be due to improved life expectancy for men. Trends in remarriage rates
among older widows are not known.

15 In 1980 the median age difference between spouses was 6.2 years (Casterline et al.,
1986); in 1993 the mean difference in ages between spouses was 7.5 (El-Zanaty et al., 1993).
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Table 3
Trends in Proportions Currently Married By Age and Sex
1980 and 1991

Female (%)

Male (%)

Age in Years

1980

1991

1980

1991

15-19

21.7

12.0

2.2

0.9

20-24

62.3

55.2

20.4

14.4

25-29

82.1

82.5

56.2

49.5

30-34

90.5

90.1

83.7

82.6

35-39

87.9

91.1

92.8

94.5

40-44

84.6

84.8

96.7

98.2

45-49

78.9

83.2

97.2

98.3

50-54

66.2

76.0

94.9

98.4

55-59

57.3

68.5

96.3

97.0

60-64

37.8

56.7

93.5

95.6

65 +

19.5

34.2

86.5

91.1

Source: PAPCHILD (1993); CAPMAS (1980), vol. 4.
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Polygyny, while permitted, 16 is quite limited in practice in Egypt and on the
decline. 17 Slightly less than 4 percent of currently married women under the age
of 49 were in polygynous unions in 1991 (PAPCHILD, 1993), as were roughly 2
percent of Muslim males, in 1986 (Orabey and Abd el-Fatah, 1991). Despite the
limited practice of polygyny, it has been argued that the very existence of men's
right to unconditionally marry another wife has had a damaging psychological effect
on women, especially in the lower-income classes (Hussein, 1985). The majority
of women in a polygynous union have no or little education (Ahmed, F., 1992);
however, even among the least educated women less than 5 percent are in such a
union (PAPCHILD, 1993).

16 Although Muslim men are permitted to take up to four wives, they are enjoined by
Islam to treat the wives equally. Unlike some other Muslim countries, Egypt's application of
Islamic law in polygyny relies on the principle of individual moral responsibility. It is up to
the conscience of every man to behave as a good Muslim in taking additional wives (AlNowaihi, 1979), By contrast, other Muslim countries have put legal force to Qur'anic
injunctions about polygyny regarding the equal treatment of wives. Some countries have
restricted polygyny by subjecting it to judicial decision and requiring equality among wives.
Tunisia has prohibited polygyny altogether (Azer, 1979).
Rugh (1984) notes that, among lower-class urban families, when a man takes a second
wife, the practice of polygyny is often far from its intended purpose in Islam—that is, to
provide humane and equal treatment under special circumstances. Many men marry again as
a simple way of getting rid of one wife while taking another, thereby avoiding certain kinds
of legal or economic complications that arise from divorce—for example, the payment of
alimony and the delayed mahr installment. Until relatively recently, a man could leave his
first wife and take up residence with a second wife, either secretly or openly. In this way, he
could avoid the alimony and mahr payments. Now a husband who marries a second wife must
declare his marital status when applying for a marriage license. The registrar must inform any
current wives by registered mail of the new marriage.
s
17 Some researchers have argued, however, that available estimates of the prevalence of
polygyny may be underestimates for two reasons. First, estimates are derived from household
lists, which only show the co-residence of multiple wives. Second, taking an additional wife
may be an incremental step in the direction of separation followed by divorce (Zurayk and
Shorter, 1988).
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Division of Responsibilities and Resources
Men traditionally have been responsible for providing for the financial needs of their
family as well as protecting the family from external dangers.

The traditional

responsibility of women through their roles as wives and mothers has centered on
the internal well-being of the family: physically, socially, and emotionally (Loza,
1988). A husband's major duty is maintenance: first to his wife, and secondarily,
to his children (Bowen, 1992). Men are heads of the family, having authority over
other family members. Men have the legal right to demand obedience from wives
and children.

A wife's duties are to maintain the home, to bear and care for

children, and to obey her husband (Bowen, 1992).

The traditional division of

familial responsibility is based upon the complementarity of gender roles, which
creates an interdependence between men and women. This interdependence can
promote family cohesion under proper conditions (Rugh, 1984; Loza, 1988).
Family cohesion can be strengthened through the interdependence of spouses, or
through their specialization in market and nonmarket production, if alternative
sources of the goods and services each spouse provides are not readily available.
For example, the right of men to take additional wives is a factor that can
undermine family cohesion. This right, and particularly its abuse, lessens husbands'
dependence on wives. Another example is Hoodfar's (1988) observation that many
of the services that wives traditionally provided can now be purchased in the market
(for example, food, clothes, laundry, and the like). In lower-income areas of Cairo,
Hoodfar observed that young husbands have become less dependent on their wives
because they now purchase these services in the market.
The issue of the complementarity of gender roles within the Egyptian family
has been widely discussed by religious scholars, social scientists, and Egyptian
policymakers. From the Egyptian perspective, the complementarity of gender roles
does not imply a devaluation of women or their activities.
23

Because of the

importance of the family and women's primary role in it, women's family and
household activities are highly valued by other family members (MacLeod, 1991).
For example, in explaining its reservation about Article 16 of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, which guarantees
gender equality in marriage and family life, Egypt argued that "one of the most
important bases of (marital) relations is an equivalency of rights and duties so as to
ensure complementarity which guarantees true equality between the spouses"
(Sullivan, 1992: 843). The essence of this argument is that "true equality" between
spouses is achieved through complementarity, which involves different roles and
rights for men and women. 18
Both Egyptian law and the Islamic law from which it is derived give
husbands (or male relatives) the legal responsibility for supporting their wives and
children, and give wives the legal entitlement to that support. 19

According to

Islam, the husband is responsible for the financial and social welfare of the
household (Omran, 1992). According to Egyptian law, a wife's entitlement to that
support is conditional upon the wife's obedience to her husband as head of the
family.

(A wife forfeits financial support, for example, if she disobeys her

18 It is interesting to note that Tunisia promotes a similar model of gender relations in the
family, that is, based on complementarity. On the issue of gender inequality in the model,
Tunisia argued that prerogatives are attached to function, rather than to a privileged spouse
(Sullivan, 1992). For example, because the husband provides for the family, he is the head
of the family and is, therefore, owed obedience. The argument of Tunisia is that inequality
arises from function, not from gender. Omran (1992), in discussing some of the gender
inequalities inherent in Islamic inheritance law, makes a similar argument. The power of these
arguments, however, is reduced when the actual functions of men and women change.

s

19 The 1979 reforms of the Personal Status Law clarified the meaning of "husband's
support of wife" that was stipulated in Article 1 of Law No. 25 of 1920. "Husband's support
of wife" was clearly defined to include food, clothing, lodging, cost of medical care, and other
customary items. Such support is obligatory regardless of the wife's health, financial
resources, or religion. Support should not stop if a woman goes out of the home for
necessities or for lawful work without her husband's permission (Rugh, 1984).
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husband, refuses to return to the home when requested to do so by her husband, or
abuses the privilege of leaving the home for work to the detriment of her family;
see Rugh, 1984.)

Religious writers in Egypt argue that the father who abandons

work and neglects his family has committed an evil act toward himself, his
offspring, and society (Rugh, 1991).
To what extent is the traditional gender division of financial responsibility for
the well-being of the family maintained in contemporary Egypt? Although good
data are not available to fully answer this question, a variety of studies suggest that
Egyptian women are making substantial and increasing contributions to the financial
well-being of the family. This trend is due to women's rising aspirations for their
own material living conditions as well as for their children's future, limited growth
of husbands' real income, marital disruption, and, in some cases, the husband's
migration from home in search of work. In the context of the limited growth of
husbands' real incomes, lower-income wives express sympathy for their husbands
and feel that they should help their husbands fulfill their financial responsibilities to
the household (Hoodfar, 1988). 20 A recent study found that more than half of the
working women in urban areas report that they are responsible for all household
expenses (Nawar et al., 1994). Moreover, husbands' approval of wives' financial
contribution to the household budget is high:

nearly 60 percent of Egyptian

husbands approve of this role (El-Zanaty et al., 1993). While a woman's risk of
nonsupport due to migration, divorce, polygyny,21 desertion, widowhood, or
20 Loza argues that "part of the traditional responsibility of women is to make ends meet.
That means that income provided by the husband (which is not necessarily or even usually all
the income needed by the family) is managed by women to cover basic needs of the family.
Costs of extra family needs felt by the wife are usually covered by income generated by her"
(1988: 9).
21 Women in polygynous unions are more likely to work than others—26 percent vs. 17
percent (CAPMAS, 1993). These findings are consistent with anthropological observations
of a low-income area in Cairo in which at least one of the wives in polygynous unions has to
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disability22 may be no greater today than in the past, the consequences for those
women who are unsupported are clearly graver than in the past, given families'
increased need for cash income to meet basic needs and crucial child investments
in a modernizing economy.
Most men in nonprofessional occupations who migrate for work leave their
families in Egypt. Although most of these men attempt to support their families
during the migration period, the flow of resources may be irregular and intermittent.
In some cases, women are left to fend for themselves (Hoodfar, 1993). A recent
study of Egyptian women found that 22 percent of women whose husbands had
migrated were not currently receiving money from their husbands (CAPMAS,
1993). The irregular flow of remittances or the lack of remittances forces women
to assume financial responsibility for the family when traditional support systems
are not effective. Although women have traditionally relied on support from their
own or their husbands' families under these conditions, nowadays these traditional
support systems do not always provide women with reliable economic protection
(Badran et al., forthcoming).
Wives' willingness to help their husbands, however, does not change their
belief that men are responsible for providing for the family. They argue that this
is natural: it is what God has arranged and should not be questioned (Hoodfar,
1988). In addition to women's financial contributions through their market labor,
Egyptian women have long contributed to household resources through their
nonmarket production as well as through other activities, including (1) the

work, as the husband cannot provide for all of his wives (Environmental Quality International,
1988). Similar observations have been recorded in rural areas (Khattab, 1992).
22 Husbands may not support their families because they are unemployed, underemployed,
or simply irresponsible (EQI, 1988). A large percentage of civil status cases involve
husband's nonsupport of children, wives, and ex-wives. The percentage of nonsupport cases
rose from 35 percent in 1975 to 42 percent in 1982 (Koura and Hamed, 1989).
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appropriation of public goods and services, (2) rent and transfer of goods and
services through gift exchange, and (3) skillful management and allocation of
household resources that minimizes the need for scarce resources such as cash
(Hoodfar, 1990).

However, women often do not view such activities as work

(Anker and Anker, 1989).
In Egypt, as in most societies, women are largely responsible for the care of
the home and of children.

For example, 81 percent of women report that their

husbands do not help in housework (CAPMAS, 1993). One area of childrearing in
which Egyptian fathers participate is children's education.

Fathers' income

contributes to educational expenses and fathers' .time contributes to the transporta
tion of children to school and to helping children with homework.
Both the declining quality of and the increasing competition in the educational
system have increased the importance of out-of-school inputs (such as students',
parents', and tutors' time) to learning. This situation requires parents to sacrifice
their time and money to ensure their children's educational success (Loza, 1988).
The decline in the quality of public education has also fueled demand for private
schooling, and the availability of private schools has increased in recent years. 23
The increased importance of family investment in children's educational
success has expanded women's childrearing responsibilities and has engaged

23 In 1992/93, 6.3 percent of primary schools, 7.6 percent of preparatory schools, 22.5
percent of general secondary schools, and 33.6 percent of commercial schools were private
in Egypt. These aggregate figures mask large differences by governorate. The extent of
private schooling is greatest in the urban centers, particularly in Cairo. For example, 30
percent of primary schools, 33 percent of preparatory schools, 51 percent of general secondary
schools, and 34 percent of commercial schools in Cairo are private (Ministry of Education,
1993). Although the availability of private schools is greatest in the urban centers, most
governorates now have private schools. Only two frontier governorates, South Sinai and New
Valley, had no private primary schools in 1992/93.
Private education is growing, particularly at the lower levels. For example, between
1988/89 and 1992/93, 241 new private primary schools and 229 new private preparatory
schools went into operation (Ministry of Education, 1992; 1993).
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Egyptian fathers in childrearing. Some educated mothers report spending several
hours each day supervising their children's school work. Lacking the skills to assist
their children with school work, uneducated mothers obtain the assistance of
educated relatives, friends, or neighbors, or they direct family income toward the
hiring of private tutors. More income and more of parents' time are needed to
ensure educational success. The relative role of Egyptian mothers and fathers in
financing these educational investments is largely unexplored. This issue needs to
be examined in order to understand how the costs of educating children are
distributed between fathers and mothers.
Women's control of household resources varies widely (Hoodfar, 1988). It
has been hypothesized that the greater women's control over household resources,
the more likely they will be able to move resources into the improvement of
maternal and child health. Such control is thought to be enhanced by women's
participation in the material production activities of the household (Shorter and ElTawila, 1990).
The effect of women's work on the control of household resources is mixed.
Some studies indicate that women's work enhances their control (Zimmerman,
1982). For example, Nadim (1985) found that Cairene women who contribute to
family income are accorded a direct, overt role in family decisionmaking. Other
studies find no effect of women's work on control (Lynch and Fahmy, 1984).
These mixed results are consistent with women's opinions about whether working
gives women greater power in the household. A recent study revealed that only
about one-half of Egyptian women reported that a working wife would have more
of a say in household management than housewives (CAPMAS, 1993).
Specific evidence of gender disparities in the distribution of household
resources relates primarily to the allocation of food and health care among family
members. For example, boys continue to be somewhat more likely to be taken to
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a private physician or health facility when ill than girls (El-Zanaty et al., 1993).
The tendency for boys to receive higher-quality health care than girls is more
pronounced in small-scale studies (Langsten and Hill, 1991; Hoodfar, 1986; ElMougi et al., 1991).
Furthermore, in rural Egypt, the percentage of income spent on women's
health needs is not equitable. Their illnesses are more likely to be managed by
resorting to home remedies, drugs purchased from the pharmacy, traditional healers,
or government physicians than are the illnesses of higher-status family members
(males and adult mothers with sons), which are managed by private physicians
(Lane, 1992). One factor that contributes to this is the widespread norm of maternal
sacrifice (Khattab, 1992). Over one-half (56 percent) of Egyptian women report
that they do not take care of their own health to the same extent as that of their
husbands and children (CAPMAS, 1993).
Women's Autonomy in Intimate Relations and Sexual and Reproductive Decisionmaking
Unlike other religions in which procreation is the exclusive purpose of sexual
relations, according to Islam sexual relations in marriage need not always be for the
purpose of having children (Omran, 1992).

For example, according to texts of

Islamic jurisprudence, the wife has the right to sexual fulfillment (Bowen, 1992).
According to contemporary Islamic writers in Egypt, the husband has the
indisputable right to sex in the marriage relation. One writer reported the belief that
the wife must fulfill her husband's desires whenever they occur (Rugh, 1991).
Little is known about the extent to which individual choice is exercised in sexual
relations between Egyptian spouses. Anthropological evidence indicates that the
threat of marital disruption through divorce or polygyny may limit the extent of
women's choice in engaging in sexual relations. For example, one rural Egyptian
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woman said, "During intercourse, I get severe pains.... However, I say never mind,
it is his right. I am afraid he might marry another woman if I don't do my best"
(Khattab, 1992: 18).
Evidence suggests that Egyptian men and women do not always share the
same fertility preferences or attitudes toward family planning. For example, nearly
20 percent of Egyptian women reported that their husbands' ideal number of
children was higher than their own ideal (Esmael, 1992). How these differences are
resolved can have implications for actual fertility.

An equitable resolution of

differences requires that spouses discuss and negotiate about fertility desires and
family planning use. Recent evidence suggests that Egyptian spouses have limited
communication about these issues. About one in two couples in Cairo and Upper
Egypt has ever discussed the number of children they want, according to husbands.
Substantial percentages of Egyptian husbands have never discussed family planning
with their wives—for example, 34 percent in Cairo and 53 percent in rural Upper
Egypt (Sayed et al. ; 1992).

Forty-five percent of couples do not agree on the

relative roles of husbands and wives in childbearing decisions. Indeed, fewer than
half of the women whose husbands believe that the man should have the main
influence on childbearing decisions agree with their husbands (El-Zanaty et al.,
1993). From a slightly different perspective, 69 percent of currently married women
feel that husbands should not have the last word on having another child (Nawar et
al., 1994).
In terms of approval of family planning, 91 percent of women who know
about family planning report that they approve of its use, and 67 percent believe
their husbands approve (El Zanaty et al., 1993) These data suggest, however, that
a substantial minority of women think that their husbands disapprove of family
planning. For example, among women who are not currently practicing family
planning, 40 percent think that their husbands disapprove of it (Mokhtar and
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Mostafa, 1992). Recent data about male attitudes, on the other hand, suggest that
male approval of family planning is high: 92 percent of males in Cairo and 84
percent in Upper Egypt (Sayed, El-Zanaty, and Cross, 1992).
Choice with respect to sex and the use of family planning within marriage has
important health implications in the context of possible exposure to sexually
transmitted diseases (STDs) and AIDS. Little is published about the prevalences of
STDs and AIDS among Egyptian men and women. What is published suggests that
the number of such cases is low. This has been explained by the social mores of
the culture, which prohibit and impose strong sanctions against premarital and
extramarital sex, particularly among women.24 However, a recent study of 509
rural Egyptian women, who presumably come from very conservative backgrounds,
suggests that women may be at greater risk of contracting STDs than was previously
thought.

Among these women, 18 percent had trichomoniasis, 9 percent had

chlamydia, and 2 percent had definite pelvic inflammatory disease (PID), with an
additional 17 percent having possible PID (Youfiis et al., 1992). Because men's
access to multiple partners is not so severely proscribed, there is the fear that
migrant husbands may bring STDs into marriage and infect their wives.
Domestic violence is a problem in Egypt as it is in many societies, but it is
poorly studied (Lane, 1992; Khattab, 1992).

Wife abuse is not considered

acceptable in Egyptian society (Mohsen, 1990); moreover, religious writers assert
that a man is not a good Muslim if he abuses his wife (Rugh, 1991). Nonetheless,
anecdotal evidence suggests that some physical violence against wives is expected
and tolerated, particularly in lower-income settings (Ibrahim, 1993). Despite the
legal and social restrictions on wife abuse, women without strong family protection

24 While premarital and extramarital sex for men is strongly condemned, it still receives
tacit approval. For women, the consequences can range from forced early marriage, to severe
restrictions on movement, to death in some villages.
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have limited options to escape abuse despite their legal right to report their husbands
to the police (Lane, 1992).
Rape is one of the most underreported crimes in Egypt. Concern for the
victim's as well as the family's reputation is the main reason (Mohsen, 1990).
Unlike some other areas of criminal law, rape law (as well as the attitudes of law
enforcement officials) tends to favor the rape victim, who, by definition, can only
be female in Egypt (Article 276 of the Criminal Code). 25 In Egypt, unlike the
United States, for example, it is easy to prove the woman's lack of consent. The
absence of consent is defined broadly to cover any situation in which the woman's
will to resist is weakened (Mohsen, 1990). No studies are known in Egypt that
address the issue of marital rape and no legal precedent exists for prosecuting this
act.
Implications for Demographic Behavior of Gender Inequalities Within the Home
As already observed, both women and men in Egypt enjoy status and security within
marriage through mutual support and a complementarity of roles. Wives may have
a certain autonomy in the management of the household and even in the manage
ment of their own property.

However, the relative ease with which men can

divorce or marry additional wives can create a large degree of insecurity in women,
particularly those with limited resources (for example, education, financial
resources, and family support). Such insecurity, especially in the context of limited
power and/or resources, may induce women to have more children than they want,
to subordinate their health needs, and to accept sexual domination. The negative
effects of gender inequalities in marriage and divorce law are most likely to be felt

25 Punishment for rape is imprisonment at hard labor. The sentence is for life if the rapist
is a member of the woman's immediate family, someone with authority over her, someone
entrusted with her care, or a domestic in her service (Mohsen, 1990).
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by the most vulnerable women. Other women who have strong family backing,
education, or a secure financial base can use these advantages to reduce the effects
of gender inequalities.
A woman faces a much greater chance than a man of having to cope alone
as a widow for at least some phase of her later years, as well as much greater
insecurity in her marriage contract given her limited use of protections against
unilateral divorce or polygyny. Furthermore, custom and inequitable inheritance
laws leave most widows dependent on their children for financial support in their
old age. While improved life expectancy may have increased the number of years
that women can expect to be protected within marriage, rising aspirations and the
growing cash requirements for family maintenance in a modernizing economy have
increased the negative economic consequences for those women who must live
without a husband's support. Also, the woman's increasing economic contribution
to the family is seldom balanced with any domestic assistance from her husband or
with any decrease in the time required to fulfill her other family roles. However,
some Egyptian men have responded to these new economic demands by taking extra
part-time jobs or by migrating to one of the Arab countries for temporary work
(Mohsen, 1985; Hoodfar, 1991).
Clearly, both parents are experiencing the rising costs of children, but
mothers are experiencing these costs especially acutely, as their time demands have
increased both in terms of productive work and growing time inputs at home.
Children in school have less time to contribute to domestic work and require more
assistance with their school work. While mothers—given their greater likelihood
of widowhood and nonsupport—may feel more dependent on their children than do
fathers, family ties remain strong. A few relatively well-educated children may be
able to provide for their mothers as effectively as children who are less well-
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educated. 26 Indeed, as observed above, evidence suggests that women currently
have slightly lower fertility preferences than their husbands on average, possibly as
a result of the relatively greater time costs women with children experience.
Women who have greater personal autonomy and influence in family
decisionmaking are more likely to have a say in family size and family planning
decisions. Significant indicators of personal autonomy include choosing one's own
husband, standing up for one's views in disagreements with the husband, showing
concern for one's own health and appearance, and participating in paid employment.
The greater a woman's autonomy measured according to these characteristics, the
lower her fertility desires and her actual achieved fertility. This relationship is
particularly notable among the youngest women in a recent study (Nawar et al.,
1994). Thus, it appears that increases in women's autonomy within a system that
perpetuates and even accentuates some gender inequalities in domestic roles and
responsibilities may lead to further fertility declines. These shifts result as women
experience a rising share of the costs of childrearing while at the same time having
a greater say in fertility and family planning decisions. Whether and how such
improvements in women's autonomy are likely to occur in rural areas, particularly
in rural Upper Egypt, is a matter of concern, however.

Gender Inequalities in Public Life
According to Egyptian law and, in most cases, Islamic law, Egyptian women enjoy
equality with men in nearly ail spheres of public life, most particularly education,
commerce, employment, and property ownership. The right to education is granted
to all citizens in the Egyptian Constitution. The provision of "free" education from
the primary level through the university, as well as the existence of compulsory
26 For example, such is the case in Thailand, which has experienced a very rapid fertility
decline (Knodel et al., 1990).
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attendance laws,27 have promoted equality of educational opportunity in Egypt
(Articles 18 and 20 of the Egyptian Constitution) (Zulficar, 1993c). Additional
support for the principle of equality of educational opportunity comes from Islam.
Both the Our'an and the Hadith indicate that learning and scholarship are central to
Islamic faith and culture and that women are required to learn as much as men
(Omran, 1992). Furthermore, women are entitled to equality of employment
opportunity, equal pay for equal work,28 and special accommodation for their
family responsibilities. Islamic law and Egyptian law entitle women to ownership,
to their independent fortune, and to the absolute right to deal with their own
properties (Madkour, 1990). 29 According to Islamic law, women have the right
to work and to be involved in trade and commerce. Moreover, women have equal
legal capacity. That is, they can enter into all kinds of contractual arrangements
and conduct business without the need for their husbands' or fathers' consent
(Omran, 1992).
Despite the rights that they share, women and men participate in public life
to very different extents. Historic patterns and differences in their rights and roles
within the family are key factors explaining these differentials. In employment,
inherent legal contradictions between equal opportunity laws and protective labor
legislation further limit women's employment opportunities.

A variety of laws

27 Egypt has a long history of compulsory primary school attendance. Education for girls
and boys between the ages of 7 and 12 years was made compulsory by the Ministry of
Education in 1933 (Khafagy, 1990). Currently, national educational policy advocates
compulsory education for children aged 6 to 14 years, although this is not effectively enforced
(CAPMAS and UNICEF, 1988).
28 Overall the earnings of Egyptian women are 79 percent of male earnings, with wider
gender gaps in manual occupations (Zaytoun, 1991).
29 Working women report that while most husbands do not interfere with the way a wife
spends her earnings, a minority (20 percent) of husbands do (CAPMAS, 1993).
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affecting both the public and private sectors have been enacted that recognize
women's family responsibilities30 : (1) the right to paid maternity leave for three
months for up to three children (50 days in the private sector), (2) the right to
unpaid child-care leave for up to two years (only one year in the private sec
tor—three times), (3) the right to work part-time, (4) the right to two half-hour
breastfeeding breaks for 18 months, (5) the responsibility of employers of over 100
women to establish a nursery (although this law is not effectively enforced), and (6)
the right of the spouse to leave without pay to accompany his or her partner for
work abroad.

Other laws are designed to protect women, such as the law that

prevents women from working at night except in certain circumstances, or the law
that prevents women from performing jobs that are harmful to them physically or
morally. 31 These limitations (protections), which often make female workers more
expensive and therefore less desirable as employees, do not apply to men.
The appropriateness of women's employment is the subject of active public
debate among parliamentarians and religious leaders in Egypt. A draft law that was
presented in 1985 to the parliament proposed that women be provided with half pay
in exchange for their agreement to quit work. While never passed, this proposition
is still being debated. This draft law was motivated by two factors: (1) the belief
that working women were neglecting their children, thereby contributing to the
increase in juvenile delinquency and drug addiction, and (2) concern about high
levels of male unemployment (Ibrahim, 1993). This viewpoint also contends that
husbands and women themselves suffer from the formal work of women. Abdel

30 State Civil Servants System in accordance with Law No. 47/1978 Art. 69, 70, 71, and
72; Public Sector Servants System in accordance with Law No. 48/1978 Art. 71, 72, 73, and
74; Labor Law No. 137/1981 Art. 154, 155, 156, and 158 (A Group of Interested Ladies,
1988; The Communication Group, 1992).
31 Labor Law No. 137/1981 Art. 152 and Art. 153 and Ministerial Decree No. 23/1982
(A Group of Interested Ladies, 1988).
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Kader (1990) suggests that rising levels of unemployment within the context of "a
devastating economic crisis" have contributed to this call for a return to traditional
roles for Egyptian women. Alternative perspectives within the debate include the
view that working women should get leave with half pay during the family
formation stage (Loza, 1988) and the view that, while women's contribution to
development is needed, working women should be supported with better services
(including child care) that would allow them to effectively perform their work and
family roles (Loza, 1988). 32
All of these views reflect a concern for the protection of women's traditional
family roles.

Notably absent from this debate is a discussion of the role that

husbands and fathers could play in facilitating the work of women. It appears that
this idea is not likely to surface with any force. One observer goes so far as to say
that "the role of women in the family and their responsibilities for the health and
well-being of their families will not change" (Loza, 1988: 15).
The debate takes on additional dimensions given that some claim that
employment is forbidden to women by religion and the Qur'an (MacLeod, 1992).
MacLeod reports that "the question of whether women may work outside the home
is a matter of great controversy.... In general, there is confusion... about what
Islamic texts actually state, and reliance on custom is common" (1992: 550). This
confusion is facilitated, in part, by the expressed opinions of various religious
writers in Egypt. Some profess that Islam allows women to work only as long as
it is adapted to her "natural" qualities (for example, nursing, teaching, or doctoring
her own sex). 33 Others profess that a woman's father, husband, or guardian must

32 Other services might include employer-provided transportation and of meals.
33 A study of veiled and unveiled university students, for example, revealed that a large
majority of both groups—88 percent and 95 percent respectively—thought that work outside
the home for women was acceptable. Like the religious writers, however, both groups of
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agree to her work, particularly if he has sufficient income to support her in the
absence of her financial contribution (Rugh, 1991). Furthermore, in sexually
integrated work places, women are expected to behave with the utmost propriety.
It is clear that these views are more restrictive than the Islamic position expressed
by Omran (1992) and those contained in civil law. In the view of a female Islamic
activist, Zeinab al-Ghazali, Islam does not prevent a woman "from working,
entering politics, and expressing her opinion, or from being anything, as long as
that does not interfere with her first duty as a mother" (Hoffman, 1985: 236).
Education
While the proportion of the population that is illiterate has declined over the last 25
years from 70 to 50 percent of Egypt's population (see Table 4), the gender gap in
proportions illiterate remains wide (63 percent of females versus 37 percent of males
were reported as illiterate in the 1986 Census). Among ever-married women of
reproductive age, the proportion with no schooling has fallen from 60 percent
among 45-49-year-olds to 48 percent among 20-24-year-olds. At the other end of
the educational spectrum, the proportion completing a secondary school education
or higher has risen from 8 percent among the oldest reproductive-aged women to
25 percent among the 20-24-year-old group (El-Zanaty et al., 1993).
Overall enrollment ratios have risen dramatically to near-universal primary
enrollment and 82 percent of 12-17-year-olds enrolled at the secondary level (see
Table 5). Furthermore, enrollment figures show steady progress in reducing gender
disparities, although substantial regional disparities exist (Ministry of Education,
1992; 1993). The female-to-male ratio in primary school enrollments has risen
women thought that education and medicine were the most appropriate types of work (Ahmed,
L., 1992). A more recent study of Egyptian women found that only 24 percent believe that
certain jobs are more suitable for women, including teaching, nursing, and office work
(CAPMAS, 1993).
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Table 4
Trends in Illiteracy By Sex, Ages 10+: Selected Years
1960-1986
Percentage Illiterate

Ratio of
Female to
Male
Illiteracy

Census Year

Total

Males

Females

1960

70

59

84

1.4

1976

57

43

72

1.7

1986

50

37

63

1.7

Source: CAPMAS, 1960, 1976, and 1986 Egyptian Censuses.
from 67 to 85 over the last 25 years and from 41 to 77 in the case of secondary
school enrollments. The proportion of enrollees at the primary, preparatory, and
secondary levels who are female stands at 45 percent for 1992/93, with 35 percent
of the enrollments at the university level being female. 34
Egyptian women have high educational aspirations for their children,
particularly in relation to their own levels of education. (In fact, the educational
aspirations of Egyptian parents for their children have been shown to be very

34 Gender inequalities exist within secondary education, which has both academic and
vocational components. In the academic component (General Secondary), females represented
45 percent of enrollments in 1992/93. In the vocational component, females represented 68
percent of Commercial, 36 percent of Teacher Training, 29 percent of Industrial, and 24
percent of Agricultural enrollments (Ministry of Education, 1993). The inequalities in
vocational enrollments reflect traditional gender differences in occupation, although there is
some indication that these traditional boundaries may be changing. For example, female
secondary school enrollments are growing fastest in the industrial schools. Between 1988/89
and 1990/91 enrollments increased 56 percent. Moreover, female enrollments in the teacher
training schools decreased by 45 percent in the same period (Ministry of Education, 1992).
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Table 5
Trends in Gross Primary and Secondary Enrollment Ratios, By Sex,
1965-1990

Secondary (12-17)

Primary (6-11)

Year

Total

Male

Fe
male

1965

70

90

60

.67

26

37

15

.41

1970

72

87

57

.66

35

46

23

.50

1975

75

89

60

.67

43

55

31

.56

1980

70

90

,72

54

66

41

.62

1985

91

101

65
82

.81

66

77

54

.70

1990

98

105

90

.86

82

92

71

.77

F/M
Ratio

Total

Male

Fe
male

F/M
Ratio

Source: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook (various years through 1992).

important in explaining children's participation in schooling and in their educational
attainment; see Cochrane et al., 1988.) Seventy-seven percent of women want their
sons to complete university and 65 percent want their daughters to complete a
university education (Esmael, 1992). Those in urban areas are more likely to aspire
to a university education for their sons (90 percent) and daughters (84 percent) than
are those in rural areas (68 percent for sons and 51 percent for daughters).
Although middle- and upper-class urban parents universally send their
children to school, lower-class urban and rural parents do not (Rugh, 1985;
Khafagy, 1990).

It is among the lower class in urban areas where the most

significant changes in parents' aspirations for their children are occurring.
Increasingly, parents send their daughters to school in order to enhance their
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qualifications as marriage partners (Rugh, 1985; Loza, 1988). 35 Government jobs,
despite their low pay, are considered to be the most suitable for women because
they make it relatively easy for women to fulfill their professional and family roles
(Hoodfar, 1993). Greater education for the daughters of the urban lower class has
also been facilitated by a reassessment of the value of boys' education (Hoodfar,
1990). An increase in the relative wages of skilled craftsmen as well as opportuni
ties for lucrative employment in Arab countries has led some lower-income parents
to prefer that their sons pursue an apprenticeship for a trade or attend a technical
school rather than continuing with a secondary education. In many of these families,
it is not unusual to find the older sons with a secondary or university education,
while the younger ones have only a few years, after which they learn a trade.
Thus, the withdrawal of sons from school has meant that more funds are available
for daughters (Hoodfar, 1990).
Another motivation for the increased education of daughters lies in the desire
of lower-income urban parents, particularly mothers, to provide their daughters with
some kind of economic security and a degree of independence (CAPMAS and
UNICEF, 1992). Such financial independence is viewed as an important hedge
against marital failure (Hoodfar, 1990; Loza, 1988).
On the other hand, rural parents in Upper Egypt have been particularly
resistant to the idea of educating their daughters. A study conducted in that region
showed that parents express several reasons for not sending their daughters to

35 Not only lower-income parents, but also female university students express the view
that the purpose of education is to enable women to be good wives. L. Ahmed (1992) reports
the results of a study of veiled and unveiled university students in which 54 percent of unveiled
and 76 percent of veiled students said that the purpose of educating women was to enable them
to be good wives. Less than 6 percent in either group thought that the purpose was to prepare
women for jobs.
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school. These reasons include (1) fear that she will gain too much freedom, 36 (2)
lack of a birth certificate, which is required for school attendance, (3) the need for
girls' household labor,37 and (4) the preference to invest limited resources in sons'
education, which will contribute to the parents' old-age support (since girls become
part of their husbands' families and, thus, do not normally support parents)
(Khafagy, 1990).
The demand for girls' household labor may be an important factor that affects
the enrollment of girls, their persistence in attendance, and their academic
performance. 38 Also, while both sons and daughters have household tasks, the
demand for girls' household labor appears to be greater than that of boys. While
the most common activity of boys and girls is work at home, boys spend 1.2 hours

36 One young male bureaucrat in an Upper Egyptian village said, "Many fell ah in here
don't let their daughters leave the house to go to school and the like because they fear that
their girls will gain a sense of freedom, which is always dangerous. [By venturing out] the
girls will also gain a knowledge of the world of men and, if they learn to read, they will read
the wrong kinds of books, not the Koran" (Adams, 1986: 173).
37 Khafagy (1990) reports that rural girls are expected to look after their siblings, to fetch
water, to assist with cooking and washing, and to perform agricultural work, especially at
harvest time. Even when girls in rural Upper Egypt attend school, it is not uncommon for
their attendance to be irregular. Khafagy (1990) reports that girls are asked by their mothers
to miss two days of school per week—one for washing day and another for baking day. This
attendance pattern affects girls' school performance as well as teachers' attitudes toward female
students. Some girls in this region report both verbal and physical abuse from their teachers.
Such abuse causes girls to hate school and to drop out.
38 Hoodfar (1986) reports that in lower-income families in Cairo, elder daughters
participate actively in child care. Girls begin child-care activities as early as 7 years of age.
Some families keep the eldest daughter out of school in order to help with child care and daily
housework. Although this practice is diminishing, "elder daughters are still held responsible
for much of the housework and child rearing, so they often do poorly at school or drop out"
(Hoodfar, 1986: 32).
Anthropological evidence from a Lower Egyptian village also suggests that the demand
for girls' assistance in domestic work is an important reason why they do not attend school
(Abaza, 1987). Mothers in this village reported that they could not afford to educate all of
their children and, hence, concentrated on the education of the boys (Abaza, 1987).
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per day and girls spend 2.9 hours per day, on average, working at home (Guhl,
1990). Therefore, unequal demand for household labor translates into educational
disadvantage for girls.
Employment
Two principles underlie the rights granted to women in Egyptian labor law: (1) the
principle of equality among all citizens in the field of work, and (2) the principle
of ensuring compatibility between women's duties toward their families and their
work in society (A Group of Interested Ladies, 1988). Not only does the 1971
Constitution express this principle of equality (Article 14), but Egypt has ratified
numerous conventions that detail how this equality in the field of work should be
achieved. 39 For example, Presidential Decree No. 434/1981 gave most of the
contents of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women the force of law. 40

Article 11, which outlines

women's equal rights in work, is law in Egypt. 41

39 UN accords that Egypt has ratified include the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, June 13, 1985 (Abdel Kader, 1990), the International Pact on
Economic and Social Rights, and Equal Pay for Equal Work (A Group of Interested Ladies,
1988). Egypt has also ratified several conventions with the International Labor Organization
related to women's employment. These include No. 45, Underground Work (1935); No. 82,
Right of Employment (revised 1947); No. 100, Equal Remuneration for Men and Women
Workers for Work of Equal Value (1951); and No, 111, Discrimination in Employment and
Occupation (1958).
40 Egypt expressed reservations regarding four Articles of the Convention: Article 9,
paragraph 2, granting women equal rights with men in terms of the nationality of their
children; Article 16, concerning equal rights for men and women in family law; Article 2,
concerning policy measures to be undertaken to eliminate discrimination; and Article 29,
paragraph 2, concerning the use of arbitration to resolve differences between state parties to
the Convention (Zulficar, 1993c).
41 Labor Law No. 137/1981 Art. 151 (A Group of Interested Ladies, 1988).
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Despite the (virtual) equality in employment rights that Egyptian women
enjoy, reported levels of female participation in the labor force are low (see Table
6). The large differential between men and women stems, in part, from underesti
mates of female labor force activity.

Official estimates suggest that female

participation is very low; however, improved reporting procedures result in much
higher estimates of female labor force participation. For example, the results of the
Methods Test Survey (conducted by the International Labour Organization and the
Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics) indicate that among sampled
rural Egyptian women, 12 percent were engaged in a paid (that is, wage or salary)
labor force activity in the week prior to the survey, 37 percent were engaged in a
monetized, market-related labor force activity, and 80 percent were engaged in a
labor force activity according to the internationally accepted definition of the labor
force (Anker and Anker, 1989). When a 10-hour-minimum-per-week criterion was
applied, the above rates become 11 percent, 29 percent, and 54 percent, respec
tively.
Females in the formal labor force experience higher rates of unemployment
than do males, although the gender gap in unemployment has declined from the
1976 level because of the relatively large increase in unemployment that males have
experienced (Nawar, 1991). Ibrahim (1981) argues that greater attention should be
paid to women's increased demand for formal jobs, as evidenced in rising
unemployment rates and in the high ratio of female applicants to job openings in
factories, for example (Papanek and Ibrahim, B., 1982), rather than to the low
reported levels of female participation.
Unlike the pattern for Egyptian males, officially reported labor force
participation for females peaks at ages 20-24 and then declines with age as women
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Table 6
Trends in Labor Force Participation and Unemployment
By Sex, 1976 and 1986
Census Year

Labor Force Participation Rates
__________(12 years and older) ___
Males

Females

1976

74.2

6.3

1986

70,5

9.6

Unemployment Rates (12 years and older)
Males

Females

1976

4.1

18.3

1986

10.5

24.5

Source: CAPMAS, 1976 and 1986 Egyptian Censuses.

marry and take responsibility for their families (see Table 7). 42

Recent trends

suggest that this pattern may be changing among younger cohorts of women. The
most dramatic increase in women's labor force participation over the last 25 years
is occurring among women aged 20 to 40 during their peak childbearing and
childrearing years. Hence, a major feature of the change in the female labor force
42 Because of the problems in the reporting of female labor force participation (Anker and
Anker, 1989), the accuracy of such a pattern cannot be confirmed. An alternative age pattern
has been found in a study of a settlement in Cairo. There the proportion of women working
rises during the life course. Five percent of women aged 20-24 work, rising to 12 percent
of women aged 45-64, and remaining at that level thereafter (Shorter and El-Tawila, 1990:
16).
More research is needed to resolve this issue because the age pattern of female labor
force activity influences the nature of support systems that are needed by working women in
order to ensure the well-being of the family.
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Table 7
Trends in Labor Force Participation Rates By Age and Sex:
Selected Years 1960-1986
Males

Females
Age

1960

1976

1986

1960

1976

1986

6-9

5.3

96.8

1.3

14.0

20.8

4.9

10-14

9.7

5.5

1.6

28.4

30.0

11.9

15-19
20-24

8.6

5.1

7.3

68.4

49.9

40.2

7.3

12.4

20.5

86.6

71.7

79.9

25-29

4.8

10.8

17.6

96.0

92.9

95.4

30-34

4.5

7.8

14.9

97.8

97.0

96.7

35-39

4.4

5.5

9.8

98.1

98.2

97.3

40-44

5.3

4.3

8.3

97.9

97.9

95.2

45-49

4.4

3.5

6.0

97.7

98.2

94.2

50-54

4.6

3.2

4.3

96.3

96.8

91.3

55-59

3.4

2.7

3.4

94.5

95.0

88.8

60-64

3.2

2.2

2.0

85.2

76.8

68.3

65 +

1.9

1.1

0.7

62.5

40.9

25.5

Total

5.9

5.5

6.2

68.3

53.7

48.3

Source: Ismail (1991), Table 3.
is the rising proportion of women workers who are likely to be mothers with
children.
Because women's financial contribution to the household is reported to be
their main motivation for entering the labor market, the labor supply decisions of
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wives and daughters are best understood as part of family strategies to maximize
resources (Ibrahim, B., 1981). A recent study of Egyptian women found that the
overwhelming majority (95 percent) of those who were working were contributing
to household expenses (Nawar et al., 1994). Whereas in the past, working-class
families, for example, obtained additional income through the deployment of young
boys to the labor force and only in crisis situations deployed wives or older
daughters, these days such families have reassessed the costs and benefits of female
labor because of changing economic conditions and new perceptions about the value
of education and of wage employment (Ibrahim, B., 1981).
Despite the movement of Egyptian women into formal employment, their
experience with "emancipation" and newly won rights has been conflict-ridden and
complicated. Lack of support services, including daycare, and the persistence of
traditional values concerning their roles and status have forced working women to
cope with double- and multiple-role conflicts and an increased work load (Abdel
Kader, 1990).
Not all working women have been affected by these conflicts and the
increased work load. Educated women of the urban upper-middle class have social
support for the lucrative jobs they hold that opened up as a result of Sadat's opendoor policy. Also, their use of domestic servants means that they do not double
their duties and responsibilities by going to work (Mohsen, 1985).
Employment among other groups of urban women is complicated by their
inability to afford domestic help and by the ambivalent attitude that fathers and
husbands have toward their wives' and daughters' work.

A recent survey of

Egyptian men, for example, found that 70 percent of men in Cairo and Upper Egypt
believe that a woman's place is in the home and that she should not work. There
was little variation in these attitudes by age or by educational level (Sayed et al.,
1992). These attitudes appear to be at odds with the substantial levels of husbands'
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approval for wives' contributing to the household budget (that is, 59 percent of
husbands in the 1992 EDHS) (El-Zanaty et al., 1993). Many of the educated urban
lower-class women are employed in public sector jobs, particularly government
offices (Mohsen, 1985; Hoodfar, 1991). 43 Employment opportunities for lowerclass women are limited, entailing arduous, unenjoyable work (Rugh, 1985; Loza,
1988).
The main problem for these women is that they remain responsible for child
care and housework. They do not have enough resources for household help, as
noted above. Nor, as we observed earlier, have men assumed a greater share of the
domestic responsibilities. In addition, men are reluctant to accept women's new
role, feeling a great deal of resentment as their wives or daughters leave home and
enter the outside world, with its temptations (Mohsen, 1985). M
The situation of women engaged in more informal employment is different.
For example, the productive activities of rural women often include animal
husbandry, poultry raising, the production and selling of dairy products, and
seasonal field work (CAPMAS and UNICEF, 1992).

Such activities are not

incompatible with women's home and family responsibilities and are often an
extension of those responsibilities.

The time and physical demands of such

activities, however, are exhausting. One rural woman described how fear of her

43 Hoodfar (1991) argues that the economic logic for a married woman to be employed
in the government sector has been eroded. The benefits of such employment (that is, meager
wages) no longer outweigh the considerable costs, which include the direct costs of clothing,
transportation, and child care as well as the indirect costs to the household, such as reduction
in the woman's household production, a reduction in her ability to shop efficiently, and so
forth.
44 The adoption of conservative Islamic dress appears to be one strategy that women use
to minimize male opposition to their public roles and to legitimize their presence in sexually
integrated work places (Mohsen, 1985; Badran, 1991; Ahmed, L., 1992; Hoodfar, 1991;
MacLeod, 1992).
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husband's annoyance induced her to persist in a work load that made her feel as
though she would "drop dead" from fatigue (Khattab, 1992: 16).
Implications for Demographic Behavior of Changing Gender Roles in Public Life
Improvements in the educational attainment of younger women have contributed to
rising ages at marriage, higher levels of contraceptive use, and lower fertility rates.
But additional dramatic changes have occurred among this group as well, possibly
due, along with other factors, to the increased role that women are playing in the
financial support of their families. According to the 1992 EDHS, the median age
at marriage for ever-married women aged 25 to 49 who completed secondary school
is 24 years, while it is 18 for women with no education, 19 for women with some
primary education, and 20 for women who have completed primary or have some
secondary school education. Contraceptive use among currently married women
with no education is 38 percent as opposed to 58 percent for women who have
completed secondary school and even 53 percent for women with some primarylevel education. In the most recent period, the fertility rate a.nong the most educated
women was 2.9 children per woman as opposed to 5.0 among women with no
education (El-Zanaty et al., 1993).
For women participating in the formal labor market, the costs of children can
be particularly high if work is far from home and working hours are inflexible. The
most dramatic trend is the rise in the number of mothers who are working in the
formal labor market at a time of peak demands on their time at home. Such trends
reflect growing financial pressures at home and the increasing importance of
mothers' double burden as factors in fertility decisionmaking. While increasingly
knowledgeable and more able than in the past to make decisions for their own and
their children's best interests, Egyptian women appear to be accepting growing
financial responsibilities within the family as well as new childrearing roles in
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support of their children's education. Egyptian men are also intensifying their efforts
to produce income for the family and to assist in the education of their children.
One consequence of these trends, particularly in urban areas, is a preference for
fewer children that is increasingly manifest in current levels of fertility.
While only a small percent of Egyptian women are officially recorded as
working in the wage or salaried sector, more women are contributing monetarily to
the family (through nonmarket activities).

The consequences of these trends in

areas such as rural Upper Egypt are less clear and may depend, in part, on parents'
aspirations for improvements in their children's education and health and their
capacity to act on those aspirations.

Gender Inequalities in the Provision of Reproductive Health Services
Women in Egypt can obtain modern reproductive health care from both the public
and the private sectors. The major government provider is the Ministry of Health
(MOH), whose primary source of reproductive health services for women is a
network of approximately 3,700 family planning service outlets, such as rural health
units, maternal and child health centers, and general hospitals (Egyptian Fertility
Care Society, 1990). In addition to family planning services, a substantial majority
(89 percent) of government facilities offer other reproductive health services for
women, such as pre- and post-natal care, deliveries, and laboratory examinations
(CAPMAS, 1992).

In 1992, 35 percent of women who were currently using

modern methods of family planning obtained their services from the public sector
(El-Zanaty et al., 1993).
Little is known about the availability of reproductive health services for men
in the government basic health care facilities. Since male reproductive health care
(treating, for example, infertility or STDs) is the domain of dermatologists/venereo
logists (and, to a lesser extent, urologists) in Egypt, such care for men by the
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government theoretically should be available in university hospitals and specialized
hospitals for skin and venereal disease, usually found in the major cities.
Many complaints about the quality of the services in government-sponsored
rural health units, which are widely accessible, have been expressed (Lane, 1992;
CAPMAS, 1992; Sayed et al., 1993). These units are often staffed with newly
graduated doctors who are performing compulsory public service for a low salary
(Lane, 1992). In addition to their lack of clinical experience, many of the doctors
are negatively biased toward the poor and uneducated whom they treat. Moreover,
most of the physicians in rural health units are male, because the female graduates
generally do their public service within commuting distance of their families' urban
homes. The dominance of males in the rural health units tends to decrease women's
use of public health services because of modesty codes and rural women's
preference for female doctors.
Because of the low perceived quality of public health services, even relatively
poor individuals often seek care from private providers (Lane, 1992).

Private

modern providers of reproductive health care for men and women include general
practitioners, obstetricians/gynecologists, dermatologists/venereologists, urologists,
hospitals, pharmacists, and private voluntary organizations.

The last-named

organizations usually focus on family planning services for women. The extent to
which a full range of reproductive health services is offered varies by provider type.
Theoretically, the physician specialists should be able to provide a full range of
reproductive health services for men and women, though this has not been
documented. Private voluntary organizations offer a number of reproductive health
services for women; however, deliveries, gynecological services, and examination
prior to marriage are offered to a lesser extent than are pre- and post-natal care,
infertility treatment, and lab exams (CAPMAS, 1992). Pharmacists offer a limited
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range of reproductive health services, focusing largely on the provision of family
planning methods; however, they are popular among users.
Private modern providers of reproductive health care services are more
widely used for family planning services than are public sector providers. In 1992,
63 percent of women who were currently using a modern method of family planning
obtained their services from the private sector—28 percent from a private
doctor/clinic, 7 percent from a private voluntary organization, and 28 percent from
a pharmacy (El-Zanaty et al., 1993).
A limited range of family planning methods is available in Egypt, with
female methods dominating. The pill and the IUD are the most widely promoted
and available female methods in family planning units; 100 percent of public and
private health units offer the pill, and 94 percent offer the IUD. Not surprisingly,
these methods are also the most widely used family planning methods, with all of
the increased contraceptive use in the last 10 years being explained by the very
rapid uptake of the IUD (see Table 8). Foaming tablets (65 percent), jellies/creams
(28 percent), and injectables (15 percent) are less widely available in clinics
(CAPMAS, 1992). Diaphragms have only recently become available in the clinics
of some private providers (Sayed et al., 1993), and use of these methods is limited,
as is the use of all methods other than the pill and the IUD (see Table 8).
Officially, abortion and female sterilization, or voluntary surgical contraception
(VSC), are not available as general family planning methods. They are, however,
possible to obtain for documented medical reasons. Table 8 shows that, unlike the
situation in many other developing countries, female sterilization is used to a very
small extent in Egypt.
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TableS
Percent Distribution of Current Contraceptive Users By Method,
1984 ECPS, 1988 EDHS, and 1992 EDHS
Method_______________1984 ECPS

1988 EDHS

1992 EDHS

Any Modern Method

94.7

93.7

95.1

Pill

54.5

40.5

27.4

IUD

27.7

41.5

59.2

Injection

1.0

0.2

1.1

Norplant®

0.0

0.0

0.0

Diaphragm/Foam/Jelly

2.3

1.1

0.8

Condom

4.3

6.3

4.2

Female Sterilization

5.0

4.0

2.3

Male Sterilization

0.0

0.0

0.0

Any Traditional Method

5.3

6.3

4,9

Periodic Abstinence

2.0

1.6

1.5

Withdrawal

1.0

1.3

1.5

Prolonged Breastfeeding

2.0

2.9

1.9

Other Methods

0.3

0.5

0.2

100.0

100.0

100.0

Total Percent

Number of Women_________9,158________8,221________9,153____
Notes: Individual percents do not add to 100 due to rounding. ECPS is the Egyptian
Contraceptive Prevalence Survey; EDHS is the Egyptian Demographic and Health Survey.
Source: El-Zanaty et al. (1993), Table 5.3.
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Induced abortion is illegal in Egypt except to preserve the health of the
mother (Population Reference Bureau, 1991; Lane, 1992). 45

Because abortions

are legally performed as a medical treatment, they do not require the husband's
approval, although a medical committee's approval is generally required.
Government-supported facilities do not perform abortions; hence, availability is
limited to private facilities. For example, the Population Reference Bureau (1991)
rated the availability of abortion in Egypt as 3 on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being
the lowest availability.
Despite the official illegality of abortion, law enforcement agencies do not
actively pursue violations of the law. The government stance has been that abortion
is a private matter that does not require interference except in criminal circum
stances. Moreover, in the rare cases when abortion is reported to the police, it is
difficult to prosecute successfully (Mohsen, 1990).
The attitude of the law enforcement agencies, which is passive, appears to
be more consistent with the options available in Islamic law than in current Egyptian
law. For example, the opinions of the Islamic schools of jurisprudence on abortion
range from complete prohibition (the Maliki school) to complete permissibility (the
Zaydi school) (Omran, 1992). Individual Muslims are not bound by the opinion of
any particular school; theoretically, they are free to choose.

45 Egyptian Penal Law issued in 1937 prohibited and punished by imprisonment the
following acts: "(1) willfully aborting a pregnant woman by a blow or similar means of bodily
harm (Article 260); (2) willfully aborting a pregnant woman by administering medicines or
using other methods resulting in abortion, or directing her to these methods with or without
her consent (Article 261); (3) any woman knowingly consenting to take medicines or other
methods or enabling another to use them on her, thereby actually causing abortion (Article
262); and (4) If the aborter is a medical doctor, surgeon, pharmacist or midwife, the penalty
would be long-term imprisonment with hard labor" (Azer, 1979: 84-85). Despite the
illegality of abortion under penal law, other articles of the law permit individuals to obtain
treatment for medical conditions (Fathalla, 1993; Zulficar, 1993b). Hence, abortion for
medical reasons is legal.
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Law and practice are often two separate matters. Because of the limited
availability of safe and affordable abortion services, many women resort to unsafe
abortion, performed either by a poorly trained practitioner or by themselves with
indigenous methods (Lane, 1992).

Hoodfar (1986) reports that lower-income

women in Cairo faced with unwanted pregnancies sometimes try to induce abortion
by carrying heavy loads up and down stairs or by taking large doses of medicines
and herbs. Abortions by physicians or dayas are feared and are only considered to
be a last option. Lane (1992) cites estimates of about 60,000 induced abortions per
year, one-third being performed with unsafe traditional methods.

It has been

estimated that between 2 and 10 percent of all maternal deaths are caused by such
unsafe abortions. Many Egyptian physicians argue that denying safe, medically
assisted abortions leads women to jeopardize their lives by seeking abortion
elsewhere. Others argue that since the government actively encourages the use of
family planning for birth spacing and planning, it has an obligation to help those
women who experience contraceptive failure under its programs (Hassan and
Fathalla, 1994).
Another procedure that is not officially promoted as a family planning method
is voluntary surgical contraception.

Female VSC may be legally performed in

Egypt for medical reasons only. The limited efforts at introducing VSC in Egypt
have focused on women.

For example, all of the recent grants made by the

Association for Voluntary Surgical Contraception to Egyptian organizations were
for female VSC (Population Reference Bureau, 1991). The issue of male VSC
appears to be particularly problematic because of psychological and religious
opposition. Moreover, Egyptian urologists are not trained to perform vasectomies
(Fathalla, 1993). Hence, the availability of VSC services is extremely limited. Not
surprisingly, on a scale of 0-10 (lowest to highest), Population Reference Bureau
(1991) rates the availability of VSC in Egypt as 0.
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Religious opposition to VSC stems from the dominant view that sterilization,
which generally causes a permanent loss of fertility, is not permissible, except for
medical reasons. However, some Egyptian theologians, notably, Sheikh Ahmad
Ibrahim, a leading theologian of the first half of the twentieth century, argued that
there is no religious objection to sterilization (Omran, 1992).

The fact that a

diversity of opinions has been expressed by theologians about the permissibility of
sterilization raises the question of whether or not Muslims in Egypt should be
allowed individual choice in this matter. Other Muslim countries, such as Tunisia,
Turkey, and Iran, permit VSC and have high rates of female sterilization.
Although spousal consent is not required by law to perform VSC, the
accepted procedure is for physicians to obtain spousal consent (Fathalla, 1993).
This practice is consistent with the principle espoused by theologians and adopted
by the national population policy that family planning is a matter that should be
undertaken with the mutual consent of spouses. However, others argue that spousal
veto practices violate human rights guaranteed in national constitutions and in
international human rights conventions (Cook and Maine, 1987).

In cases of

separation or emergency, spousal approval can be virtually impossible to obtain.
The low prevalence of female sterilization appears to stem from its limited
availability rather than from lack of interest. Nearly half of the Egyptian women
who know about family planning consider it acceptable or sometimes acceptable for
a woman to have an operation to prevent her from becoming pregnant again,
provided that she has the number of children she wants and her husband agrees
(Sayed et al., 1989: 60). There are several interesting aspects about these attitudes.
First, they conflict with current religious interpretation (that is, the majority
opinion) and law. Second, there is very little regional variation in this opinion.
Even in the most conservative region, rural Upper Egypt, 45 percent of women said
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that female sterilization is acceptable. Third, the least educated women are the most
likely to consider female sterilization acceptable (Sayed et al., 1989),
The only modern male method of contraception available is the condom.
Although this method is widely available in family planning units (89 percent of
units offer the condom; CAPMAS, 1992), as well as in pharmacies, its use is very
limited (see Table 8).

In general, reliance on male family planning methods is

insignificant. Among currently married users, 4 percent reported using the condom,
1.5 percent practice withdrawal, and none use male sterilization. There is little
support among Egyptian males for the use of male methods. Less than one-third
of the males in Cairo and Upper Egypt who know about any of the male methods
approved of their use (Sayed et al., 1992). One reason for this pattern is, no doubt,
the low priority given to male contraception in national campaigns and programs.
Condoms are also associated with promiscuity for many Egyptians (Hassan and
Fathalla, 1994).
Although Egyptian men assume little responsibility for the actual use of
contraceptives, they do participate in other aspects of family planning. More than
one-third accompany their wives to a provider to obtain a method. About half of
ever-users of supply methods had obtained the method for their wives (Sayed et al.,
1992). This suggests that further opportunities exist to involve men in effective
family planning.
In addition to issues of method choice and availability, shortcomings with
other aspects of care have also been documented and, because women are the
primary users of family planning, they are the ones who bear the brunt of these
shortcomings. One of the most severe problems is the lack of technical competence
among many family planning providers. In addition, less than half of female family
planning users (who essentially use either the pill or the IUD) consulted a doctor
prior to adopting a method (Sayed et al., 1989). Consulting a physician, however,
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does not always ensure that a woman will receive a proper medical evaluation.
More than one-fifth of new acceptors at family planning units reported that the
physician did not medically evaluate them before prescribing a family planning
method (CAPMAS, 1992). The knowledge of pharmacists, the major suppliers of
the pill, about the correct use of the pill has serious gaps (Sayed et al., 1993). It
is not uncommon for physicians and pharmacists to advise women to take an annual
one-month "rest" from the pill.
Furthermore, as women are socialized from childhood to endure the physical
malaise and suffering associated with menstruation, pregnancy, and childbirth
(Khattab, 1992), communication between clients and providers is often difficult.
Compounding the problem of communication, many women themselves have a poor
understanding about their ovulatory cycles or their reproductive health. 46 As a
consequence, health professionals often display a patronizing attitude toward their
female clients and do not provide them with adequate counseling to empower them
as knowledgeable users of family planning.
Implications for Reproductive Choice of Inequities in Service Provision
Neither the number nor the distribution of skilled female physicians adequately
addresses the preferences of Egyptian women, who are currently the primary users
of contraception (CAPMAS, 1992). Given the realities of women's family lives,
trained female service providers, who are more likely to be sensitive to women's
reproductive needs and with whom female clients are more likely to feel comfort
able discussing intimate matters, are often unable to relocate their (typically urban)
families to staff the rural health clinics where they are most needed. At the same
46 Only 17 percent of ever-married women know that the fertile time in the ovulatory
cycle is in the middle of the cycle. Men's knowledge is somewhat better: about 30 percent
of males in Cairo and 21 percent in Upper Egypt can identify a woman's fertile period (Sayed
etal., 1992).
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time, while it is understood that husbands have an important role to play in family
decisions about contraception, there appears to be no social expectation that they
should participate directly in family planning through the adoption of male methods.
Despite poor quality services and a limited range of methods, women have a strong
motivation to practice contraception and 47 percent of currently married women in
Egypt are now doing so.

Better-quality services would surely increase the

effectiveness of that use, with implications for further fertility decline. Improved
services would also likely draw in new users or those who discontinued use because
they have been discouraged by existing services. Greater participation of men in
the actual practice of family planning would also be likely to lead to improvements
in women's reproductive health through greater protection against STDs and a
lowered likelihood of adopting the IUD or pills, which may be contraindicated by
women's other health conditions (Zurayk et al., 1994).

Thus, a better balance

between men and women both on the provider and the client sides is likely to serve
women's interests and to spread more fairly the responsibilities of family planning
practice within the growing number of families that desire two or three wellnurtured and educated children.

Summary and Conclusion
In the midst of rapid social, economic, and demographic changes, the family
remains a strong and cohesive institution within Egyptian society. It is within this
secure context that almost all Egyptian children are born and most are raised. It is
here as well that gender roles are defined; gender roles in public life have evolved
in ways that have not threatened the fundamental integrity of the family. These
very positive attributes of the family that provide a stable environment within which
to plan a future for most Egyptians also lead to certain inequalities and vulnerabili
ties for women. In analyzing problem areas within the field of gender norms and
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practices that have implications for demographic behavior, we have probably given
more weight to the negative than to the positive because of our ultimate concern
with policy. Therefore, before moving on to some of the insights for policy, we
would like to highlight some of the important strengths of the Egyptian family
system that support both women and men and should facilitate the achievement of
reproductive health and choice.
Marriage is a lifetime commitment for most Egyptians, which is supported
from its very inception by parental participation in the selection of partners and later
on by a complex web of social and institutional systems of support that nurture and
sustain it. Because men as well as women draw social status from their families,
there is a strong commitment on the part of most men to support their children and
a high social value placed on motherhood.

The clearly defined roles between

spouses often include mutuality in such decisions as the numbers and spacing of
children. Furthermore, sanctions against multiple sexual partners, for both women
and men, appear to result in a relatively low level of extramarital sexual activity,
thus protecting against the rapid spread of AIDS and other sexually transmitted
diseases.
In a number of other areas, however, this report has identified some of the
negative consequences of gender patterns that are significant for the effect they have
on family welfare and demographic change.

These are areas in which policy-

makers, legal advocates, and service providers may usefully focus more attention
and resources.
Within the family, women suffer from unequal status both in law and in
practice that leaves them particularly vulnerable when the family system breaks
down. The inequity of divorce provisions, the possibility of a man taking another
wife, differences in eligibility of inheritance and child custody provisions all leave
women at risk of finding themselves without the family's social and financial
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support while having additional family responsibilities. While the widespread use
of the marriage contract theoretically provides women with the legal means to
protect themselves against many of these risks through the introduction of various
provisions, lack of knowledge and reticence about mixing legal negotiations with the
marriage celebration have left women unprotected from these risks. Programs of
legal literacy and fuller use of the options available through the marriage contract
could redress some aspects of women's insecurity in this area. Another area where
clearer public education and enforcement of existing laws are needed concerns
physical abuse within marriage.
Power and decisionmaking within marriage are subject to great variation in
Egypt, but in general, men are able to translate financial and customary advantage
into a dominant position vis-a-vis their wives. Even when women begin sharing
financial responsibility with men, it rarely translates in other areas into egalitarian
partnerships.

One possible program intervention that has not been explored in

Egypt concerns gender images in mass media and school curricula.

Both are

powerful tools of socialization and could be utilized to encourage new attitudes
toward women among boys and young men.
Improvements for women in educational attainment have not yet been
strongly reflected in greater participation in the formal labor force.

Indirect

evidence suggests, however, that women are participating in the informal sector,
which is beyond the reach of any of the provisions of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.

Women are

increasingly experiencing a double burden that goes unnoticed in the official
statistics. To bring greater equity to the labor market and more social supports to
working families, more must be known about the existing situation and policies
devised to assure women a fair return on their labor and social supports, such as
day care.
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With respect to the delivery of family planning and reproductive health
services, men must be encouraged to play a more active role as users of family
planning, and, at the same time, services should be more carefully designed to meet
women's reproductive health needs—defined more broadly than family planning.
A wider choice of methods, better counseling and follow-up, better training for
providers, and better working conditions for female providers would go a long way
in that direction.
The reduction of these inequities in private and public life as well as
improvements in the service delivery system would further increase the security of
family life in Egypt at the same time that it would provide social support for
women's greater autonomy in both the public and private arenas. The result should
be greater confidence in the future, greater access to both public and private
resources, and a secure base from which to make long-term reproductive choices.
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